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Abstract
Previous studies that have directly manipulated outcome desirability have often found little effect on
likelihood judgments (i.e., no desirability bias or wishful thinking). The present studies tested whether
selections of new information about outcomes would be impacted by outcome desirability, thereby biasing
likelihood judgments. In Study 1, participants made predictions about novel outcomes and then
selected additional information to read from a buffet. They favored information supporting their prediction,
and this fueled an increase in confidence. Studies 2 and 3 directly manipulated outcome desirability
through monetary means. If a target outcome (randomly preselected) was made especially desirable,
then participants tended to select information that supported the outcome. If made undesirable, less supporting
information was selected. Selection bias was again linked to subsequent likelihood judgments.
These results constitute novel evidence for the role of selective exposure in cases of overconfidence
and desirability bias in likelihood judgments.
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Previous studies that have directly manipulated outcome desirability have often found little effect on 
likelihood judgments (i.e., no desirability bias or wishful thinking). The present studies tested whether 
selections of new information about outcomes would be impacted by outcome desirability, thereby 
biasing likelihood judgments. In Study 1, participants made predictions about novel outcomes and 
then selected additional information to read from a buffet. They favored information supporting their 
prediction, and this fueled an increase in confidence. Studies 2 and 3 directly manipulated outcome 
desirability through monetary means. If a target outcome (randomly preselected) was made 
especially desirable, then participants tended to select information that supported the outcome. If made 
undesirable, less sup- porting information was selected. Selection bias was again linked to subsequent 
likelihood judgments. These results constitute novel evidence for the role of selective exposure in 
cases of overconfidence and desirability bias in likelihood judgments. 
Introduction 
People routinely face uncertainty and grapple with questions 
such as ‘‘Is it true?’’ and ‘‘Will it happen?’’ In this Information 
Age, when people ponder such questions, they can often readily 
access relevant information. However, the available information 
can be heterogeneous in its implications, and the sheer amount 
of it can be daunting. Therefore, the act of selecting some 
information to consider further, while leaving other information 
neglected, be- comes critical. The potential for bias is 
substantial. It is easy to imagine how fund managers, policy 
makers, medical patients, and others who seek only selective 
types of information could develop distorted expectations and 
confidence about target out- comes, leading to bad decisions 
and consequences. 
The present paper addresses the influence that people’s motives 
for a particular conclusion can have on information selection and 
resulting confidence levels (i.e., likelihood judgment). We had 
three main research questions. First, does the desirability of an out- 
come have a causal impact on information selection. Second, what 
is the direction of the effect?—Does high desirability fuel the 
seeking of supporting evidence? Third, what role does a selection 
bias have in shaping confidence/optimism about the outcome? 
As a 
concrete example, imagine that Alex learns from her financial 
advisor that she will earn more from her stock holdings if 
Company A and B merge. Naturally, Alex now hopes these two 
companies will merge. If she becomes curious about the 
prospects of the merger, would Alex’s desire for the merger bias 
her interest in reading information that appears to support or 
cast doubt on the merger? Does the desire ultimately bias her 
perception of the likelihood of the merger? 
To test our research questions, we developed a paradigm that 
involves experimental manipulations of outcome desirability, as 
well as measures of both information selection and likelihood 
judgment. We know of no other published study that includes all 
these features. There are, however, two literatures that include 
studies relevant to various parts of our research—the literature 
on motivated reasoning and the more narrowly defined literature 
on the desirability bias. In the following sections, we first discuss 
how our work relates to—and is distinguishable from—existing re- 
search on motivated reasoning. Then we discuss how our research 
extends the current literature on the desirability bias. 
 
Motivated reasoning 
 
The literature defined by the term motivated reasoning is vast. As 
many review papers attest, people are often prone to arrive at 
conclusions they find desirable or comforting (Balcetis, 2008; 
Kunda, 1990; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987; Roese & Olson, 
2007; Taylor 
& Brown, 1988; Trope & Liberman, 1996). Many cognitive processes 
 
 
are flexibly dependent on directional motives—including attention, 
visual perception, memory processes, depth of processing, and 
logical reasoning (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Clark & Wegener, 
2008; Dawson, Gilovich, & Regan, 2002; McDonald & Hirt, 1997). 
Most pertinent to the present paper would be research showing 
that motivations influence information selection. For example, 
Holton and Pyszczynski (1989) found that receiving harsh feedback 
from a confederate increased participants’ interest in seeing 
negative information about the confederate. And work using 
selective-exposure paradigms reveals that people’s tendency to 
view and process information depends on whether it is expected 
to fit with current attitudes and recent choices (for reviews, see 
Hart et al., 2009; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Fischer, & Frey, 2006). 
This motivated-reasoning research provides general fodder for 
expecting that participants in our studies would tend to select 
information favoring an outcome they desire. However, there are 
two features of our research that inject some healthy skepticism 
as to whether findings from previous work can be presumed to 
provide answers to our research questions (i.e., with no need for 
an empirical test). 
One important feature is that we focus on cases in which people 
are tasked with judging likelihood, and they are aware that there 
will be a moment of truth. That is, we are interested in cases when 
people know that they will be learning whether the outcome about 
which they provided a judgment did or did not happen (was or was 
not true). This characteristic distinguishes our studies from many 
studies within the literature on motivated reasoning. In most 
studies of motivated reasoning, people do not need to worry about 
their conclusions being invalidated or checked for accuracy. For 
example, when people change their attitudes to avoid dissonance 
(Fest- inger & Carlsmith, 1959), change their self-perceived 
traits after learning what traits bode well for a successful 
life (Dunning, 2003; Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989), or change how 
they rate the validity of a test because they failed it (Wyer & Frey, 
1983), they do not need to worry that their motivated conclusions 
will be invalidated soon (or perhaps ever). There is no impending 
moment of truth. 
There are reasons to suspect that optimistic distortions in 
information search and subsequent judgments might be 
dampened or absent (possibly even reversed) when there is a 
moment of truth in sight. When a moment of truth is relevant, 
accuracy motivations might be enhanced, leading people to attend 
to evidence more carefully and avoid letting motivated biases 
influence their information gathering and processing (Gilovich, 
Kerr, & Medvec, 1993; see also Armor & Sackett, 2006; Tyler & 
Rosier, 2009). Also, in contexts when a person desires an outcome 
and will soon learn the true outcome, that person knows he/she 
will either be pleased or disappointed. Because unexpected bad 
news is worse than expected bad news, people might brace for 
bad news by becoming increasingly pessimistic (see Shepperd & 
McNulty, 2002; Shepperd, Ouellette, & Fernandez, 1996; Sweeny 
& Krizan, in press; Weber, 1994). They might even become more 
curious about whether bad news is coming, so they seek out and 
check information consistent with an undesirable outcome, which 
could provide evidence for a pessimistic likelihood judgment. 
A second important feature is that we designed our paradigm to 
test for the effect of desirability when it is clearly un-
confounded with other factors. In our main studies, which are 
described later, we used random assignment and experimentally 
created different levels of outcome desirability (the desirability 
was newly established), thereby ensuring that outcome 
desirability varied independently of other outcome characteristics 
or associations. This strategy differed from previous studies that 
have harnessed existing differences in desirability rather than 
directly manipulating it. The strategy of using existing 
differences leaves these previous studies open to alternative 
interpretations. For example, several studies have  shown  
correlations  between  the  extent  to  which 
respondents rated political or sports outcomes as desirable and 
the extent to which they expected those outcomes to occur (e.g., 
Babad, 1997; Granberg & Brent, 1983). Whereas one interpretation 
of these correlation is that desires drove expectations, the opposite 
causal path is equally plausible (see Kay, Jimenez, & Jost, 2002), 
and third-variable interpretations are also viable (for discussions, 
see Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 2010; Krizan & Windschitl,  2007, 
2009; Massey, Simmons, & Armor, 2011). 
Even among studies that have avoided obvious confounds 
associated with not experimentally manipulating desirability, 
problems relating to preexisting differences still persist. 
Consider, for example, a clever paradigm used by Ditto, Munro, 
Apanovitch, Sce-pansky, and Lockhart (2003) in which participants 
had to interpret the results for a saliva test. They scrutinized the 
test results to different degrees as a function of whether they 
thought the result suggested good health outcomes or bad 
health outcomes. This is an important and fascinating result. 
However, as Ditto and his col- leagues documented, the college-
student participants had a prior expectation that the test results 
would be favorable—leading to greater scrutiny of an unfavorable 
result. Ditto et al. noted that the a priori expectation might be due, 
quite rationally, to the fact that participants tended to have a 
history of good health (or motiva- tional processes that operate 
over time to bolster an expectation of good health).1 These 
unresolved possibilities do not provide an answer to whether a 
newly established desire that is unconfounded with other factors 
can have immediate consequences on information selection and 
optimism. 
 
 
Previous studies on the desirability bias 
 
The most direct way of testing the influence of desirability on 
optimism is to experimentally manipulate outcome desirability 
independently of other outcome characteristics  or  associations, 
and then solicit forecasts about the outcomes. This is precisely 
what many studies on the desirability bias (aka  wishful  thinking) 
have done (e.g., Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-Hillel, Budescu, 
& Amar, 2008; Irwin, 1953; Lench & Ditto, 2008; Marks, 1951; 
Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010). In a typical version of 
these  studies,  participants  learn  about  two  possible  outcomes 
and are given a monetary reason—manipulated independently of 
all other factors—for hoping that one outcome is the true outcome. 
One of the more surprising findings to emerge from this litera- 
ture is that the nature of the forecast being solicited—a discrete pre- 
diction vs. a scaled judgment—has a strong impact on the whether a 
desirability  bias  is  detected (for  a  meta-analysis,  see  Krizan  & 
Windschitl, 2007). Studies using a classic marked card paradigm 
in which participants make a discrete outcome prediction about 
whether a marked card will be drawn from a deck show that partic- 
ipants are more likely to predict a marked card when it would be a 
desirable outcome rather than neutral (e.g., Irwin, 1953; Marks, 
1951; Windschitl et al., 2010). However, the fact that discrete pre- 
dictions are influenced by desirability can be explained without 
assuming that people alter their internal assessments of likelihood 
about the outcomes. For example, a differential-threshold account 
suggests that the desirability of an outcome doesn’t change how 
evidence  is  sought  or  evaluated,  but  instead  simply  lowers  the 
threshold  for  making  an  affirmative  prediction  (Bar-Hillel  & 
Budescu,  1995;  Krizan  &  Windschitl,  2007;  Price  &  Marquez, 
 
 
1 
In an attempt to isolate the role of motivation, Ditto et al. (2003) showed that 
observer participants, who did not share the same motivations as actor-participants, 
did not exhibit the same effects when making judgments about actor participants 
described in a vignette. However, we believe there are significant limitations with this 
approach (e.g., observer-participants would have not only lacked the same motiva- 
tions as actor-participants, they would have also lacked any basis for strong a priori 
expectations about the actors). 
 
 
2005; see also the biased-guessing account by Windschitl et al. 
(2010)). 
Indeed, across different paradigms, researchers have very rarely 
found evidence that a manipulation of outcome desirability 
influences scaled judgments of how likely the outcome is (e.g., 
on a 0–100% scale; see Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007). Although both Price and Marquez (2005) and 
Windschitl et al. (2010) were able to use card paradigms to show 
that outcome desirability affects discrete predictions, a switch to a 
scaled likelihood judgment led to nonsignificant desirability 
effects within otherwise identical paradigms. Furthermore, in a 
recent study that will be discussed in more detail later in this 
paper, Vosgerau (2010) found no evidence of an optimistic 
desirability bias in likelihood judgments about an outcome 
dependent on a series of coin flips. He argued that when people 
have a stake in an outcome (whether positive or negative), this 
may increase the estimated likelihood of the outcome, but positive 
outcomes are not given higher likelihood estimates than negative 
outcomes. In fact, in his critical study, people appeared to be 
pessimistic rather than optimistic in response to outcome 
desirability (vs. undesirability). In summary, there is an 
important dearth of evidence that outcome desirability does what 
perhaps many researchers assume: boost the perceived likelihood 
of an outcome. 
 
 
The potential role of information selection in desirability biases 
 
A notable characteristic of the studies cited above regarding the 
desirability bias, is that information-selection processes were not 
at play in those studies. Participants were simply given the 
information they needed to make their likelihood assessments. As 
noted by Krizan and Windschitl (2007), there are a variety of 
cognitive processes that might mediate effects of manipulated 
desirability on likelihood judgments (but most of these 
processes have received little research attention). One of those 
potential mediators is information selection or evidence search. In 
the studies we present here, participants were given a 
heterogeneous set of information from which they could make 
selections before providing likelihood judgments. We have 
already mentioned research on selective exposure that 
illustrates the substantial flexibility that people exhibit in their 
choosing of, and processing of, new information (Hart et al., 
2009; Jonas et al., 2006). Another example is from research on 
information distortion, which demonstrates that decision making 
processes can involve the biased perception of new 
information—in the direction favoring a person’s leading 
decision option (Carlson & Russo, 2001; DeKay, Patiño-Echeverri, 
& Fischbeck, 2009; Russo, Carlson, Meloy, & Yong, 2008; Russo, 
Medvec, & Meloy, 1996). 
In short, we believed that, relative to the approach used in most 
previous studies on the desirability bias, our approach of 
presenting participants with a heterogeneous set of information—
from which pieces of information needed to be selected and pro- 
cessed—might be more conducive to observing motivated effects 
tied to outcome desirability. Nevertheless,  prior  to  conducting 
our research, there were three  plausible  possibilities  regarding 
the results. First, with a moment of truth in sight and with an 
opportunity to deliberatively select new information to read, peo- 
ple might be careful to select a balanced subset of information—i.e., 
information that both supported and challenged their preferred 
outcome (Armor & Sackett, 2006; Gilovich et al., 1993; Tyler & 
Rosier, 2009). Second, with a moment of truth in sight, they might 
become especially concerned about protecting themselves from 
disappointment and therefore become vigilant and select informa- 
tion that challenged their desired outcome or supported an unde- 
sired outcome (e.g., Shepperd et al., 1996; Sweeny & Krizan, in 
press; Weber, 1994). Third, despite the moment of truth, people 
might prefer to read information that favored the desired outcome. 
This possibility is consistent with a bird’s-eye view of the 
literatures on motivated reasoning and optimism. Although all 
three of the possible result patterns were plausible prior to our 
experiments, our expectations leaned toward the third 
possibility. We also expected that an information-selection bias 
would fuel a tendency to give higher likelihood judgments to 
outcomes that were desirable rather than not. That is, 
participants in our studies would produce clear evidence of what 
some researchers have aptly called ‘‘the illusive wishful thinking 
effect’’ (see Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995). 
 
 
Preview of paradigm and studies 
 
We used an information-buffet paradigm inspired by post- 
choice selective-exposure studies (Hart et al., 2009; Jonas et al., 
2006). Our paradigm had the following basic parts—with 
modifications unique to each experiment. First, participants saw 
a pair of artworks and were told that a nationwide sample of 
college students had already rated each of the artworks. 
Participants were made aware that they would soon need to 
estimate the likelihood that one of the artworks was the more 
preferred artwork in the pair (as rated by the nationwide 
sample). Depending on the experiment, participants either did or 
did not need to make a prediction about the artwork, and a 
monetary manipulation was used to influence how desirable or 
undesirable it would be for one of the art- works to be the more 
preferred artwork. Next, participants were given an opportunity 
to select new information. Specifically, participants saw an 
information buffet that contained previews of eight comments 
about individual artworks. Each preview allowed people to 
discern the evaluative tone of the full comment (e.g., 
‘‘Mountain Photo is a well detailed photo’’). Of the eight comments, 
there were always two positive and two negative about each of the 
two artworks. Participants selected the comments they wanted to 
read, and they provided their first likelihood estimate. Finally, they 
read the full comments they selected from the buffet before pro- 
viding another likelihood estimate. 
The first study in this paper is important in its own right, but it 
also serves as a preliminary study that sets the stage for Studies 2 
and 3, which directly test the two main research questions. Study 1 
(and Follow-Up 1.1 and 1.2) did not involve a direct desirability 
manipulation. Instead, it measured people’s information selections 
after they made a prediction and before they gave a confidence 
estimate—which has not been tested in previous published studies. 
In Study 2, we manipulated whether people stated a prediction and 
whether a particular outcome was made to be especially desirable. 
Study 3 (and Follow-Up 3.1) tested whether desirability biases 
detected in Study 2 were truly due to the increased desirability of 
an outcome or whether the bias was due to the fact that 
participants had high stakes in one outcome but not the other 
(Vosgerau, 2010). 
 
 
Study 1 
 
Study 1 tested the following hypothesis: After making a predic- 
tion between two neutral outcomes, people would tend to select 
new information that supports rather than contradicts their pre- 
dicted outcome. The study also tested how this selection bias re- 
lates to subsequent confidence about the prediction. Presumably, 
a predicted outcome becomes somewhat more desirable after it 
has been predicted, because people like to be right in their predic- 
tions. This enhanced desirability is only one of several reasons peo- 
ple might tend to select new information that supported rather 
than contradicted their predicted outcome (additional reasons 
are discussed later; see also Scherer, Windschitl, & Smith, 2013). 
 
 
Hence, Study 1 does not entirely isolate the role of desirability in 
fueling a selection bias, which we do in Studies 2 and 3. 
However, Study 1 is a logical place to start our sequence of 
studies for three reasons. First, it nicely sets up our paradigm for 
readers, making the interpretation of later studies with more 
factors much easier. Second, although desirability was not directly 
manipulated in Study 1, desire for an outcome (precipitated by the 
act of explicitly predicting that outcome) is potentially quite 
relevant in the study and in everyday contexts where people make 
predictions and subsequently gain access to additional 
information. Third, we know of no published studies that have 
both tested for post-pre- diction selection biases and for a  relation  
between  such  biases and subsequent confidence. 
Readers familiar with research on overconfidence might be 
surprised by this last claim, so it requires further explication. 
Overconfidence can be conceptualized and measured in a 
number of ways (Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999; 
Larrick, Burson, & Soll, 2007; Metcalfe, 1998; Moore & Healy, 
2008; Ronis & Yates, 1987), and the classic paradigm involves 
soliciting confidence estimates from people about their 
predictions or answers to general knowledge questions (e.g., 
Dougherty, 2001; Dunning, Griffin, Milojkovic, & Ross, 1990; 
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982; McKenzie, 1997; Sieck, 
Merkle, & Van Zandt, 2007). A common explanation for 
overconfidence in this paradigm is that people are prone to 
confirmatory processes after they have given their 
prediction/answer, but before they state their confidence (Allwood 
& Johansson, 2004; Griffin & Brenner, 2004; Hoch, 1985; Klayman 
& Ha, 1987; Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff, 1980; Metcalfe, 
1998). Specifically, this view suggests that people are more likely 
to seek, attend to, or rely on evidence that supports rather than 
contradicts their prediction, and this bias leads to an inflation of 
confidence estimates. A study by Koriat et al. (1980) is often cited 
as support for this view. In their second study, participants became 
better calibrated if they were asked to list a reason why their pre- 
diction might be wrong before they made their probability esti- 
mate (see also, Hirt & Markman, 1995; Hirt & Sherman, 1985; 
Hoch, 1985; Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). However, as noted by 
Griffin and Brenner (2004, page 186), the fact that considering- 
the-opposite interventions can reduce overconfidence does not 
necessarily mean that confirmatory search or evaluation processes 
were initially present and the main cause of overconfidence. Nor 
do such studies demonstrate that, when people are explicitly 
offered supporting and conflicting information about their 
prediction, they will select the former more than the latter. In 
Study 1 we remedied this gap in the literature by directly 
measuring potential bias in information selection after a 
prediction, and we assessed the relation of this bias to confidence 
estimates. 
Method 
Overview 
Participants made a prediction about which artwork in a pair 
was more preferred in a nationwide sample. They then had an 
opportunity to select what information from a buffet they would 
like to read more about; the buffet contained previews/titles of 
pro and con comments (ostensibly written by other college 
students) about the artworks. Participants also made two 
confidence judgments: one following their selections from the 
buffet and one after they had read the full comments that they 
had selected. This cycle was repeated for four pairs of artwork. 
 
Participants and design 
The participants were 53 students from elementary psychology 
courses at the University of Iowa. Other than counterbalancing fac- 
tors  that  were  manipulated  between  participants  (and  did  not 
significantly  influence  the  dependent  variables),  there  were  no 
manipulations in this study. 
 
Procedure 
Participants, at individual computers, began by reading 
onscreen instructions indicating that they were being tested for 
their ability to make accurate predictions about college students’ 
aesthetic preferences. They were presented with a pair of 
artworks (see the below section entitled Artwork Pairs for 
details). Participants made a prediction about which artwork was 
more preferred by college students in a nationwide sample (by 
clicking on an art- work label). Next participants saw an 
information buffet containing eight titles of comments relevant to 
the artwork pair (see the below section entitled Information Buffets 
for details). Participants were told that the comments were 
written by University of Iowa students and that they should click 
on between three and seven titles to indicate which comments 
they would like to read later. 
After selecting the titles, but before reading the full comments, 
participants were asked a confidence question. Specifically, they 
were reminded of their prediction for the artwork pair and were 
asked ‘‘What do you think is the probability that your prediction 
is correct?’’ They responded by placing a marker along a visual- 
analogue scale labeled from 0% to 100%. The marker also displayed 
its exact numeric location (e.g., it displayed ‘‘67%’’ if placed at that 
location). Instructions reminded participants that a response of 
100% meant they were absolutely certain, a response of 50% meant 
they believed their chances of being right and wrong were 
equivalent, and a response below 50% meant they believed they 
should have selected the other artwork. 
This entire sequence (prediction, information buffet selections, 
confidence estimation) was repeated for four artwork pairs. 
Upon completion of this procedure for the four artwork pairs, 
participants were asked to indicate which artwork in each pair 
they personally preferred. Then they read the full comments of 
the subset of titles they had selected earlier. After reading each 
subset of comments, they were asked another confidence question. 
Specifically, they were reminded of their prediction for the artwork 
pair and were asked ‘‘Now that you’ve read the full comments, 
what do you think is the probability that your prediction is 
correct?’’ Their responses went on the same visual-analogue scale 
mentioned  above. 
 
Artwork pairs 
There were four pairs of artworks in this study: a pair of 
abstract paintings, landscape photographs, abstract sculptures, 
and songs. The artworks were novel to the participants and 
selected from the internet. With the help of informal pilot testing, 
we tried to select artworks such that the two members of a pair 
were roughly equal in their appeal to college students. The left–
right spatial ordering of art in each pair (for the visual art: 
paintings, photographs, and sculpture) was counterbalanced. For 
the pair of songs, a 100 s clip from each song was played in a 
counterbalanced order. The order in which the four pairs of 
artwork were presented to participants was also counterbalanced.  
The  counterbalancing did not have a significant impact on any 
key results, and therefore is not discussed further. 
 
Information buffets 
Each buffet (one corresponding to each artwork pair) displayed 
titles of eight comments that were ostensibly written by local 
University students but were actually written by our lab group. Of 
the eight titles, two expressed positive evaluations of one of the 
art- works, two expressed negative evaluations of that artwork, 
two ex- pressed positive evaluations of the other artwork, and 
two expressed negative evaluations of that artwork. The titles 
that were  visible  on  the  buffet  were  short  sentences  that  
clearly 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. This is a screenshot of the information buffet for the photography artwork. It contains titles of comments ostensibly written by local students. The titles appear in a 
random order for each participant. See Appendix for the full comments associated with these titles. 
 
conveyed the valence of the full comment (e.g., ‘‘Mountain Photo is 
a well detailed photo’’; ‘‘Mountain Photo looks a little too perfect’’). 
The spatial ordering of the titles was randomized separately for 
each participant. The full-length comments were approximately 
5–6 sentences in length. As an example, Fig. 1 displays a screenshot 
of the buffet for the photography artwork, and the Appendix dis- 
plays the full comments associated with the titles on that buffet. 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses 
Our intention was to use artwork such that participants would 
be roughly equally split in terms of predictions and personal 
preferences about the two pieces in each pair. We largely 
succeeded with three of the four pairs of artworks. For the 
photograph, sculpture, and song pairs, the percentage of 
participants predicting ‘‘Piece A’’ rather than ‘‘Piece B’’ (which 
are arbitrary labels) was near 50%—specifically 58.5%, 54.7%, 
and 47.2%, respectively. Personal-preference selections of Piece A 
were also near 50%—specifically 45.3%, 56.6%, and 35.8%, 
respectively for the three pairs. The exception was the paintings 
pair, for which only 7.5% predicted Piece A and only 18.9% 
preferred Piece A. As revealed shortly, the level of this 
imbalance does not seem to be related to the main findings. 
Also, not surprisingly, participants had somewhat of a tendency 
to predict the artwork that they personally preferred (this 
occurred for 72.6% of the cases overall). 
 
Selection bias 
Participants selected  an  average of  3.3 comments from each 
buffet. Table 1 displays the rates at which different types of 
information were selected overall and for each buffet. The main 
issue in 
Study 1 was whether participants would tend select information 
that supported their prediction. Therefore, the metric for this 
selection bias is the percentage of selected comments that were 
positive about the predicted artwork or negative about the 
rejected art- work. If this percentage is greater than 50%, this 
means people were biased toward selecting supportive information 
(which could also be known as congenial or confirmatory 
information). The critical finding is that there was a robust overall 
bias; the average per- cent of supportive comments selected was 
78.1%, which was significantly greater than 50%—t(52) = 11.70, p 
< .001. As can be seen in Table 1, this bias was significant for 
each individual buffet and did not differ much in magnitude 
across the four buffets. In short, for all buffets, people were 
biased toward selecting information that supported their 
prediction. 
 
 
Confidence estimates and relations with selection bias 
Unlike typical overconfidence studies, the present research was 
not designed to directly measure calibration and overconfidence— 
we required participants to make only four predictions, and we did 
not have the national-sample, art-preference data that would be 
required for determining the precise accuracy of those predictions. 
Instead our empirical focus was on the potential influence of a 
biased selection of information on confidence. 
Recall that participants were asked about their confidence on 
two occasions for each prediction, once immediately after making 
selections from the  buffet but before  reading the subset  of full 
comments (T1 confidence) and once after having read the subset 
of full comments that were selected (T2 confidence). Mean 
confidence estimates per artwork pair are displayed in Table 2. 
The overall mean for T1 confidence was 65.5% (SD = 9.0), which 
was significantly above 50%, t(52) = 12.5, p < .001. The overall 
mean 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Title selection percentages from buffets in Study 1. 
Table 2 
Confidence/likelihood estimates for each artwork prediction in Study 1.   
e T1 estimate T2 estimate Change in estimates   
 
M SD M SD M SD 
65.5 11.0 70.1 15.5 4.6
a
 17.4 
68.2 14.1 70.9 16.7 2.76 17.3 
62.0 14.0 73.3 18.1 11.3
*** 
17.2 
66.4 14.2 71.8 15.4 5.4
* 
17.8 
Average 65.5 9.0 71.5 11.0 6.0
***
 9.4 
Note: A = % of selected titles that were positive toward the predicted artwork, B = %    
that were negative toward the predicted artwork, C = % that were positive toward 
the non-predicted artwork, D = % that were negative toward the non-predicted 
artwork. The asterisks indicate that the values for the selection bias (A + D) were 
significantly different from 50%. 
***  p < .001. 
Note: Symbols in the change column refer to whether the changes were significantly 
different from 0. 
a   p < .10. 
*  p < .05. 
***  p < .001. 
Artwork/buffet type A B C D Selection bias 
Artwork typ 
Photograph 42.1 10.0 15.1 32.7 74.8
***
 
Painting 44.8 5.7 13.1 36.4 81.2
***
 Photograph 
Sculpture 39.3 7.6 15.1 38.1 77.4
***
 Painting 
Song 48.1 9.8 11.3 30.9 78.9
***
 Sculpture 
Average 43.6 8.3 13.7 34.5 78.1
***
 Song 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlations between selection biases and confidence in Study 1. 
people tend to apply a non-motivated positive-test strategy for 
testing any focal hypothesis—in this case, the one they predicted 
Artwork type r with r with r with Change in (Klayman & Ha, 1987; Metcalfe, 1998; Sieck et al., 2007; Snyder & 
  T1 estimate T2 estimate estimates   
 
Photograph .21 .03 -.10 
Painting .02 .33
* 
.30
*
 
Swann, 1978).2 A third-variable explanation—involving pre-existing 
preferences—is also potentially relevant (see Scherer et al., 2013). 
For a given pair of artwork, some people would prefer Piece A 
Sculpture -.15 .26
a
 
Song -.12 .30
*
 
.40*** 
.35
*
 
rather than Piece B. This preference would impact their prediction 
and could also influence the information they select from the buf- 
Note: All values are bivariate correlations. For example, the upper left value (.21) is 
the correlation between the selection bias for the photograph buffet and the T1 
confidence estimate for the predicted photograph. 
a   p < .10. 
*  p < .05. 
**  p < .01. 
***  p < .001. 
 
 
 
for T2 confidence was 71.5% (SD = 11.0), which constitutes a 
significant increase from T1, t(52) = 4.66, p < .001. 
More important is the question of whether biases in 
information selection were related to T1 confidence, T2 
confidence, and change in confidence from T1 to T2. It was 
theoretically possible that strong selection biases could be related 
to high  T1  confidence because—even though participants had  not  
yet  read  the full comments—they had already focused on a 
biased set  of titles. The results, however, revealed no  
significant correlations between the degree of selection bias for a 
given art type and confidence about the relevant prediction at 
T1. See Table 3 for these correlations. 
The results involving T2 confidence were different. For 3 of the 
4 art types, there was a significant correlation between the degree 
of selection bias and confidence at T2 (see Table 3). Given those 
results, it is not surprising that the change in confidence from 
T1 to T2 (measured as  a  difference  score)  was  significant  for 
the same 3 of 4 art types. It appears that,  to the extent that 
participants selected a biased set of titles off the buffet, reading 
the full-comment versions of the biased set led to increased 
confidence. 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 1 provides a novel demonstration of the following: After 
making a prediction between two neutral outcomes, people select 
new information that supports rather than contradicts their pre- 
diction, and this biased selection of information is significantly 
related to subsequent confidence about the prediction. Although 
we do not have accuracy data to draw the typical conclusions 
about overconfidence, this finding from Study 1 clearly has 
relevance to the overconfidence literature. Whereas various 
theories have posited or implied that people seek a 
disproportionate amount of prediction-consistent evidence and 
that this leads to overconfidence (see review by Griffin and 
Brenner (2004)), Study 1 was a far more direct in testing this 
notion than other studies have been—including the studies by 
Koriat et al. (1980), which are sometimes falsely presumed to 
have tested this notion (see earlier discussion). 
Outcome desirability is one of the potential reasons why 
participants in Study 1 selected a biased set of information. 
Presumably, after having committed themselves to a prediction, 
people then desire that the outcome they predicted is the true 
outcome. Consequently, information supporting that outcome 
becomes appealing to read (e.g., Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; 
Scherer et al., 2013), and/or information conflicting with that out- 
come becomes dissonance  provoking  (Hart  et  al.,  2009;  Jonas 
et al., 2006; Kunda, 1990). However, alternatives to these 
motivated  explanations  are  also  tenable.  For  example,  perhaps  
the 
fet. To isolate the role of desirability, we need a direct desirability 
manipulation, which is what we used in Studies 2 and 3. Before 
turning to Study 2, however, we very briefly present two follow- 
ups to Study 1. These follow-ups add modest but notable 
information about the boundary conditions for the findings (Follow-
Up 1.1) and causal impacts (Follow-Up 1.2). 
 
 
Follow-ups to Study 1 
 
Follow-Up 1.1 
 
All participants (N = 15) were informed, just prior to making 
buffet selections, that they would be able to revise their initial pre- 
diction based on what they learned from the student comments. 
Otherwise, all procedures were the same as for Study 1. The 
selection biases were again robust (M = 66.1%, SD = 18.9, t(14) 
= 3.3, p < .01). This shows that even when participants have an 
opportunity to use buffet information to improve their 
predictions, they showed a tendency to select information that 
was supportive of their initial prediction. 
 
 
Follow-Up 1.2 
 
We wanted to verify that the selection biases of the type 
observed in Study 1would indeed have causal impacts on 
confidence. The correlations between selections bias and 
confidence measures provided strong initial support for this idea 
(for at least 3 of the 4 artworks; see Table 3). To gather more 
direct support, we had 26 participants make 3 predictions 
(dropping the songs pair from Study 1), but instead of making 
buffet selections after a prediction, they were given researcher-
determined buffet comments to read. Sometimes they received a 
set of 3 supportive comments and 1 conflicting comment (i.e., 
roughly equivalent to the selection biases observed in Study 1), 
sometimes they received 2 and 2 respectively (no bias), and 
sometimes they received 1 and 3, respectively (a reversed bias). 
After reading the buffet items for a given artwork pair, 
participants indicated their confidence in their prediction. The 
resulting average confidence estimates for the three conditions—
selection bias, no bias, and reverse bias—were 78.5% (SD = 10.3), 
67.0% (SD = 12.5), and 53.0% (SD = 17.7) respectively. Each mean 
was significantly different from the others in this 
within-subjects design (ps < .001). In short, this follow-up verifies 
that the type of selection biases seen in Study 1, where the average 
bias was 78.1%, would have robust causal consequences for 
confidence. 
 
 
2 
A study by Radzevick and Moore (2008) shows the general potential for focalistic 
pursuit of information and its impact on likelihood judgment. When participants 
were allowed to selected statistical information about two unnamed football teams, 
participants tended to view more information about the team that they were 
arbitrarily told was their team. The selections of information were related to 
subsequent likelihood judgments regarding which team was the winning team. While 
the results show that selective (focalistic) information searches can have 
consequences for likelihood judgment, we note that participants did not make any 
initial prediction, and they had no idea, prior to picking a given piece of 
information, whether it would bode well or poorly for a team. Consequently, the 
bias observed is not necessarily tied to motivated pursuit of information 
supporting a predicted or desired  outcome. 
 
 
Study 2 
 
The primary goal for Study 2 was to isolate and manipulate out- 
come desirability in order to test its effect on information selection 
and likelihood judgment/confidence. To isolate the effects of 
desirability, we used a straightforward monetary manipulation 
added to the same basic paradigm used for Study 1. This was 
crossed with a manipulation of whether or not people made 
their own predictions about the artworks. Hence, there were four 
cells for this de- sign. When an artwork pair appeared, either 
the participant made a prediction or the computer randomly 
‘‘selected’’ an art- work from the pair (we’ll refer to the predicted 
or selected artwork as the target). Then, depending on the 
monetary manipulation, the participant was told—just prior to 
the information buffet—that they would receive $0 or $10 if 
the target artwork was indeed the artwork preferred by most 
college students. The measures were essentially the same as 
those in Study 1 (i.e., buffet selections, T1 and T2 confidence 
questions). 
We expected that having people make a prediction (vs. no pre- 
diction) and promising $10 (vs. $0) if the target was true would in- 
crease the selection bias. In other words, we expected two main 
effects and no interaction. Consistent with the earlier discussion, 
there are at least three potential reasons to expect the first main 
effect—i.e., the increased selection bias when making a prediction. 
These include the influence of desirability, a positive-test strategy, 
and a third-variable explanation. The more important expectation 
is about the main effect for the monetary manipulation. We 
expected that regardless of whether people were in a prediction 
or no-prediction condition, when they learned that they would 
earn 
$10 if the target was true, this would cause them to desire that out- 
come. This in turn would influence their preference for 
information—namely increasing a preference for information 
suggesting that the target is true. 
In addition to these expectations regarding the selection biases, 
we had compatible expectations regarding the confidence/likeli- 
hood judgments about the target—two main effects and no interac-
tion. The first main effect of prediction-vs.-no-prediction is not 
particularly interesting; when people are allowed to make their 
own prediction, they will always be giving a likelihood estimate 
about the outcome that seemed more likely to them (because their 
prediction determines the target of the confidence question). The 
more critical expectation is that confidence would be higher in 
the $10 condition than in the $0 condition. This would constitute 
a rare example of a desirability bias detected on likelihood 
judgments within an experimental paradigm (for discussions see 
Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Krizan & Windschitl, 2007; Windschitl 
et al., 2010). Whereas previous studies have typically found no 
desirability effect on likelihood judgment, we believed the infor- 
mation-buffet paradigm is a particularly fertile context for desir- 
ability biases. The buffet provides people with a heterogeneous 
mix of new information, and people can choose to expose them- 
selves to, or focus on, a subset of that information, which could 
thereby bias their reasoning about likelihood judgments. 
 
Method 
 
Participants and design 
The participants were 102 students from elementary 
psychology courses at the University of Iowa. The design was a 
2(prediction: yes or no) x 2(desirability: $0 or $10) mixed 
factorial, with the second factor manipulated within participant. 
 
Procedure 
The procedures and materials were similar to those of Study 1, 
with  the  exception  of  modifications  that  were  introduced  to 
accommodate the two manipulations. Another difference was that 
only two artwork pairs were used: landscape photographs and 
sculptures. 
At the beginning of the study, all participants were informed 
that they might win money on some trials of the experiment. After 
other instructions, participants saw their first artwork pair. Partic- 
ipants in the prediction condition made a prediction about which 
artwork was preferred in a nationwide sample, just like Study 1. 
Participants in the no-prediction condition viewed the artwork 
pair for a minimum of 5 s, with knowledge that they would later 
make a confidence judgment about an as-yet-undetermined art- 
work from the pair. Immediately after viewing the artwork pair, 
the computer then appeared to randomly select an artwork from 
the pair. In short, some participants predicted an artwork and some 
participants witnessed the random selection of an artwork. Either 
way, we will refer to the predicted/selected artwork as the target. 
Next, the potential monetary award was specified. The proce- 
dures for the prediction and no-prediction groups were the same. 
Namely, participants were told to click a button so that the com- 
puter could ‘‘randomly select a dollar value.’’ Unbeknownst to 
the participants, the value that was then displayed was always 
$0 or $10. If the value was $10 ($0), the computer then stated that 
if the target artwork was truly the one that was preferred in a 
nationwide sample, then the participant would receive $10 ($0)— 
otherwise nothing. In short, the monetary manipulation was in- 
tended to cause people in the $10 condition to strongly desire that 
the target was, in fact, the correct artwork. This manipulation came 
after the prediction/selection of the target so that it could not 
influence the actual prediction people made (in the prediction 
condition). 
Next, all participants made 3–7 selections from the buffet, just 
as in Study 1. The instructions provided some reminders ‘‘Again, 
if [target] was preferred by more students nationwide, you will 
receive [$ amount]. Soon you will be asked to indicate your 
confidence that [target] was preferred nationwide. . .’’ 
Then all participants provided a T1 confidence estimate. The 
wording of the confidence question was slightly different from that 
used in Study 1—e.g., ‘‘How likely do you think it is that, for this 
pair of photographs, [target] had the higher preference rating in 
the nationwide sample?’’ However, the 0–100% scale was the 
same. 
After doing  all of the above steps for one artwork pair and 
then the other, all participants read all the comments they had 
selected, provided T2 confidence estimates, and indicated their 
personal preference for each artwork pair. Counterbalancing 
manipulations ensured that the two artwork pairs served in the 
$10 and $0 conditions equally often, that the two artworks 
appeared in the first and second positions equally often, and that 
the $10 and $0 conditions were in the first and second positions 
equally often. 
 
 
Results 
 
Preliminary analyses 
As in Study 1, our sample did not show overwhelming 
tendencies in their predictions or in their personal preferences for 
a particular photograph or sculpture. Within the group of 
participants making predictions, the percentage of participants 
predicting ‘‘Piece A’’ rather than ‘‘Piece B’’ (arbitrary labels) was 
65.3% for the photographs and 51.0% for the sculptures. Across 
all participants, the percentage indicating that ‘‘Piece A’’ was  
personally more preferred was 65.7% for photographs and 42.2% 
for sculptures. Also, similar to Study 1, participants in the 
prediction condition tended to predict the artwork that they 
personally preferred (79.6% of the cases). 
 
 
Table 4 
Title selection percentages from buffets in Study 2. 
Table 5 
Confidence/likelihood estimates about targets in Study 2. 
 
 
Condition T1 estimate T2 estimate Change in estimates 
 
 
 
 
Note: A = % of selected titles that were positive toward the target artwork, B = % that 
were negative toward the target artwork, C = % that were positive toward the non- 
target artwork, D = % that were negative toward the non-target artwork. The 
asterisks indicate that the values for the selection bias (A + D) were significantly 
different from 50%. 
***  p < .001. 
 
 
Selection bias 
Participants selected an average of 3.9 comments per buffet, 
and this  count did not significantly differ as a function of  any 
manipulations or interactions (ps > .20). 
Table 4 displays the rates at which different types of 
information were selected, as a function of the four cells in our 
Prediction/No-Prediction x $0/$10 design. The far-right column 
displays the magnitude of the selection bias for each cell—where 
selection bias is defined as the percentage of selected comments 
that were favorable about the target artwork or unfavorable 
about the non- target artwork. There was a significant selection 
bias (i.e., greater than 50%) for three of the four cells. 
Our main concern was whether and how the magnitude of the 
selection bias differed as a function of the manipulations. We sub- 
mitted  selection  bias  scores  to  a  2(Prediction/No-Prediction) 
x 2($0/$10) mixed ANOVA. As expected, the interaction was not 
significant, F(1, 100) = 1.57, p > .10, but the prediction and 
desirability  main   effects   were   significant,   F(1, 100) = 13.4, 
p < .001, and F(1, 100) = 4.5, p < .05, respectively. We discuss these 
two main effects (with associated simple effects) in turn below. 
The first main effect was of the following, expected pattern: 
Participants exhibited a greater selection bias in favor of the target 
when they themselves had predicted the target than when the tar- 
get had been randomly selected by the computer. Importantly, a 
simple-effect test shows that the effect of the prediction/no- 
prediction factor was significant among participants in the $0 
condition—where outcome desirability was not  an  issue  (again, 
see Table 4). In fact, in the $0 condition when participants did 
not make their own prediction, there was no significant selection 
bias. This supports the position that the selection bias is not merely 
a tendency to select confirmatory information for whatever out- 
come had been pre-specified as a target. 
The second main effect was of the following, expected pattern: 
Participants exhibited a greater selection bias in the $10 condition 
than the $0 condition. Although the Prediction x Desire interaction 
was not  significant, paired  t-tests suggest that  this desirability 
effect ($0 vs. $10) was primarily driven by participants in the no- 
prediction condition, t(52) = 2.17, p < .05, rather than the 
prediction condition, t(48) = 0.72, p > .10. The former simple effect 
is important  and  shows  that  even  when  people  have  not  made  
a 
 
 
 
 
F(1, 100) = 23.09, p < .001 and F(1, 100) = 14.71, p < .001, 
respectively. The  T1/T2 effect was  not significant, nor  were any 
interactions (ps > .10). 
The main effect for the prediction factor is not surprising; it 
reflects that participants gave higher likelihood estimates about tar- 
gets they had predicted than about targets that the computer 
randomly selected. More importantly, the main effect for desirability 
reveals more optimism about the target when it was highly de- 
sired ($10 condition rather than $0 condition). Simple effect tests 
reveal that this  desirability  effect  was  significant  at  both  T1 (p 
< .001) and T2 (p < .01), and both in the prediction condition (p 
< .001) and the no-prediction condition (p < .05). 
Also important is how the biases in information selection were 
related to T1 confidence, T2 confidence, and change in confidence. 
Table 6 displays the relevant correlations. Consistent with Study 1, 
the selection bias was not significantly related to initial T1 
confidence among participants in the  prediction  condition  (for  
both the $0 and $10), but it was related to T2 confidence and 
change in confidence. This again supports the idea that reading a 
self-selected and biased subset of comments can influence 
confidence about one’s prediction. 
A different pattern was evident in the no-prediction condition. 
The magnitude of the selection bias was significantly related to 
both T1 and T2 confidence, but it was not related to change in 
confidence. The correlation with T1 confidence suggests that 
even though participants had not yet read the full version of the 
comments they had selected, merely perusing and selecting a 
biased set of titles influenced their level of T1 confidence. An 
alternative (or co-contributing) explanation is that people who 
were highly confident about the target being correct might 
have found comments suggesting a contradictory view 
unworthy of much attention. 
The fact that the magnitude of the selection bias was related to 
T1 confidence among one group of participants but not the other 
was not anticipated and was initially puzzling. We did, however, 
develop a plausible explanation in hindsight. Participants in the 
prediction group had worked through the process of making a pre- 
diction before seeing the buffet and T1 confidence measures. 
Therefore, when making a T1 confidence estimate, the influence 
of  the  short  buffet  titles  might  have  been  drowned  out  by 
 
 
Table 6 
Correlations between selection biases and confidence in Study 2.   
prediction, simply desiring an outcome can cause people to select Condition r with T1 r with T2 r with change 
a  biased  set  of  information  to  inform  their  later  likelihood 
judgments. 
 
Confidence estimates and relations with selection bias 
  estimate  estimate  in estimates   
 
Prediction/$10 .12 .35
*
 .32
*
 
Prediction/$0 .17 .43
**
 .28
a
 
No prediction/$10 .37
**
 .42
** 
.04 
No prediction/$0 .51
*** 
.37
** 
-.17 
Table 5 displays mean T1 and T2 confidence estimates. Recall    
that T1 estimates were made after the buffet (where they read 
and selected from evaluative comment titles) but before 
participants read the selected subset of full-length comments. 
We submitted confidence estimates to a 2(Prediction/No-
Prediction) x 2($0/$10) x 2(T1/T2) mixed ANOVA. As expected, 
the main effects for  the  prediction  and  desirability  factors  
were  significant, 
Note: All values are bivariate correlations. For example, the upper left value (.12) is 
the correlation between the selection bias and T1 confidence among participants in 
the prediction/$10 condition. 
a   p < .10. 
*  p < .05. 
**   p < .01. 
***  p < .001. 
Condition A B C D Selection bias 
Prediction/$10 40.1 13.0 14.7 32.2 72.4
***
 
Prediction/$0 40.9 12.1 18.3 28.6 69.6
***
 
No prediction/$10 41.8 16.0 21.3 20.9 62.6
***
 
No prediction/$0 31.4 20.7 27.3 20.6 51.9 
 
 M SD  M SD  M SD 
Prediction/$10 76.4 12.8  74.7 15.0  -1.7 11.5 
Prediction /$0 64.9 15.6  67.9 15.5  3.0 14.2 
No prediction/$10 61.9 21.8  62.7 21.2  0.8 16.8 
No prediction/$0 53.3 22.6  55.6 22.6  2.3 17.4 
 
 
 
characteristics of the prediction-deliberation process that the 
participants had completed. By the time they were asked to give a 
T2 estimate, the prediction-deliberation process was relatively 
distant, allowing the biased set of full length comments to 
have a strong influence on T2 confidence. In the no-prediction 
condition, however, participants did not have to go through a 
prediction- deliberation process prior to the buffet and T1 
confidence measures; they were simply informed which artwork 
was the target. Participants might have viewed the artwork less 
actively, and the buffet titles suggested new insight on how to 
think about the art- works. That is, because the buffet titles were 
evaluative, a bias to attend to a subset of titles had an 
immediate impact on T1 confidence. For example, if a 
participant learned that he or she would gain money if the ocean 
photograph is the more preferred photo- graph, then a bias 
towards reading and selecting supportive buffet titles (e.g., ‘‘The 
ocean photo has an exciting dynamic.’’ ‘‘The mountain photo has 
too much going on.’’ See Fig. 1) would tend to shape confidence 
about the ocean photo even at T1. The bias then carried through 
to T2 confidence—perhaps reified but not further enhanced by 
exposure to the full length comments. 
For the no-prediction group, we also tested for evidence that the 
selection bias mediated the relationship between desirability and T1 
confidence using procedures relevant to within-subject designs (see 
Judd, Kenny, & McClelland, 2001). As already reported, the 
desirability manipulation had significant effects on both the 
selection bias and T1 confidence estimates, which is considered 
necessary for evidence of mediation. The centered sums of the 
selection biases in the 
$0 and $10 conditions (X$10+$0) and the differences in the respective 
selection biases (X$10–$0) were regressed on the differences in T1 
confidence (Y$10–$0). This analysis produced evidence consistent 
with mediation—the differences in the selection biases were 
significant predictors of differences in T1 confidence (standardized  
coefficient = .35, t(50) = 2.61, p < .05). The intercept from the 
resulting model, which represents the effect of desirability beyond 
that carried by the selection bias, was not significant, t(50) = 1.41, 
p = .17. These results are consistent with our mediational account. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 2 produced three important findings. First, the selection 
bias for evidence supporting a target outcome was greater when 
the target was a participant’s own prediction than when it was 
randomly selected by the computer. This rules out the notion that 
participants would tend to select confirmatory information for 
any specific target outcome. This does not bode well for 
attributing post-prediction selection biases to a generic 
cognitive strategy (something akin to a positive-test strategy; 
see Klayman & Ha, 1987; Snyder & Swann, 1978). 
Second, people exhibited a greater target-supportive selection 
bias when the target outcome was highly desirable (i.e., when told 
they would receive $10 if the target outcome was the true 
outcome). This desirability bias suggests that motivational factors 
can play a significant role in information searches regarding 
uncertain outcomes. Although this process has been discussed in 
previous papers on the desirability bias  (see  review  by  Krizan 
and Windschitl (2007)), this is the first time it has been directly 
tested and demonstrated. Notably, this effect was significant only 
in the no-prediction condition. One reason why this effect was non-
significant in the prediction condition might be that the 
desirability associated with the prediction itself (i.e., wanting to 
be right in one’s prediction) caused some degree of selection bias, 
and learning that one could get an extra $10 if the prediction was 
right didn’t significantly add to the impact of the existing desirabil- 
ity (i.e., the two doses of desirability were not fully additive). 
Third, the desirability manipulation also had a significant effect 
on confidence/likelihood judgments. This constitutes a rare find, as 
many studies have tested and failed to find a desirability bias on 
likelihood judgments within an experimental paradigm (for 
discussions see Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007; Vosgerau, 2010; Windschitl et al., 2010). 
Whereas previous studies have typically found no desirability 
effect on likelihood judgment, we believed the information-
buffet paradigm would be a particularly fertile context for 
desirability biases. The buffet provides people with a 
heterogeneous mix of new information, and people could choose 
to focus on a subset of that information, which could thereby 
bias their reasoning about likelihood judgments. Consistent 
with this notion, the extent to which participants exhibited a 
selection bias was significantly related to likelihood judgments 
about the target outcome. 
The results of the desirability manipulation in Study 2 take on 
additional importance in light of recent arguments and evidence 
provided by Vosgerau (2010). Vosgerau argued that there is a 
stake-likelihood effect that is perhaps more influential than a 
desirability bias. According to the stake-likelihood hypothesis, 
when people have a positive or negative stake in the outcome of 
an event, they might misattribute arousal regarding the stake itself 
to the likelihood of the outcome. Therefore, relative to a case in 
which nothing is at stake, people might inflate their likelihood 
judgments about outcomes that would be highly desirable or 
undesirable. According to this view, empirical studies that compare 
likelihood estimates for undesirable vs. desirable outcomes are 
bound to produce null effects, since the stake-likelihood effect 
would work the same under undesirable and desirable stakes. This 
view would also suggest that any significant effects in studies com- 
paring likelihood estimates for neutral vs. desirable outcomes 
might be explained by a stake-likelihood process rather than a 
desirability bias. This leads to why the findings from Study 2 are 
important. In Study 2, we found that not only did our desirability 
manipulation influence likelihood estimates, it also influenced 
information search. The stake-likelihood explanation does predict 
that likelihood estimates would be influenced (via arousal 
misattribution), but it does not predict the influence on information 
search. Therefore, the desirability-bias account appears to be a 
better explanation for the set of results for Study 2. 
 
Study 3 
 
Despite the conclusion we just discussed regarding the stake- 
likelihood hypothesis, one could reasonably imagine a more 
general version of this hypothesis. Namely, one could suppose 
that whenever stakes are high (whether in a positive or negative 
direction), people will become inclined to search for evidence 
supporting the outcome. Another way of framing this is to say that 
people’s tendency to select confirming information about an 
outcome will increase whenever the outcome would be especially 
good or bad. This possibility—while intuitively plausible—is 
critically different from our characterization of how (and why) 
desirability might influence information search and likelihood 
judgments. 
To address this possibility, we conducted Study 3. In Study 3, we 
used the same general paradigm and we focused exclusively on a 
no-prediction context. We had two goals in mind: (1) to replicate 
the effects of desirability that were detected in Study 2, and (2) 
to test the impact of learning that a target outcome would be unde- 
sirable (result in a loss of money). One might expect that when 
people learn that an outcome is undesirable, they would become 
keenly interested in information suggesting the outcome might 
happen. However, consistent with the idea that people prefer a 
more positive orientation, we expected that participants’ interest 
in information supporting a target would be reduced when the tar- 
get is undesirable. In other words, we expected participants to 
select more disconfirming information when the target outcome 
was undesirable rather than neutral (or desirable). 
 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
The participants were 96 students from elementary psychology 
courses at the University of Iowa. 
 
Procedure and design 
The procedures were similar to those in the no-prediction 
condition of Study 2 with some key exceptions. First, participants 
were warned that they could win or lose money during the study. 
If they won more than they lost, we would pay them the 
amount, and if they lost more than they won, they would not 
have to pay any- thing. Second, all four artwork pairs from Study 
1 were used, with a minor alteration to one of the paintings.3 
Third, the photographs and sculpture pairs always came first, 
followed by the paintings and songs. Finally, like in Study 2, each 
participant experienced a trial in which $10 would be received if 
the target artwork was the artwork preferred nationwide, and 
there was a comparable trial in which $0 would be received (called 
the +$10 and +$0 trials, respectively). Un- like Study 2, each 
participant also experienced a trial in which $8 would be lost if the 
target artwork was the artwork preferred nation- wide, and there 
was a comparable trial in which $0 would be ‘‘lost’’ (called the -$8 
and -$0 trials, respectively). We chose $8 rather than $10 for 
the loss value so that more participants would finish their 
sessions with at least some money in hand. For half the 
participants, the +$10 and +$0 trials came first (in counterbalanced 
order), and for half the participants, the -$8 and -$0 trials came 
first (again in counterbalanced order). 
In summary, each participant experienced the four types of 
trials (+10, +0, -$8, and -$0). The +0 and -0 trials were logically 
very similar, but not fully collapsible. Therefore, the most 
effective way of characterizing the design is that it allowed for 
two main comparisons: One between the +$10 and +$0 trials, 
and one between the -$8 and -$0 trials. 
Results 
Selection bias 
Participants selected an average of 4.1 comments per buffet, 
and this count did not differ significantly as a function of the 
desirability manipulation. Table 7 displays the rates at which 
different types of information were selected. The far-right column 
displays the magnitude of the selection bias for each cell. There 
were two critical findings. First, replicating Study 2, the index for 
the selection bias was significantly greater in the +$10 cell 
than in the 
+$0 cell, t(95) = 3.01, p < .01. Second, the index in the -$8 condi- 
tion (which was 45.2% and not significantly different from 50%) 
was significantly smaller than the index in the -$0 condition, 
t(95) = 2.25, p < .05. In other words, participants were more prone 
to select supportive information about an outcome when it was 
desirable rather than neutral, and they were less prone to select 
supportive information about an outcome when it was undesirable 
rather than neutral. 
Table 7 
Title selection percentages from buffets in Study 3. 
 
Desirability condition A B C D Selection bias 
+$10 37.4 17.3 22.7 22.6 60.0
***
 
+$0 30.3 22.3 29.7 17.7 48.0 
-$8 29.2 23.9 30.8 16.0 45.2
a
 
-$0 32.6 23.0 22.6 21.7 54.3 
Note: A = % of selected titles that were positive toward the target artwork, B = % that 
were negative toward the target artwork, C = % that were positive toward the non- 
target artwork, D = % that were negative toward the non-target artwork. The 
asterisks and superscript indicate results of t-tests comparing the values for the 
selection bias (A + D) to 50%. 
a   p < .10. 
***  p < .001. 
 
 
 
Table 8 
Confidence/likelihood estimates about targets in Study 3. 
 
 
Desirability  condition T1 estimate T2 estimate Change in estimates 
 
   
M SD M SD M SD 
 
 
+$10 62.5 22.3 62.2 24.2 -0.3 16.4 
+$0 53.9 23.1 54.7 22.0 0.9 20.2 
-$8 48.6 23.1 49.2 22.3 0.6 18.3 
-$0 57.4 21.7 58.2 21.9 0.8 19.3 
 
 
 
 
Fs < 1. In short, people tended to give higher likelihood estimates 
in the +$10 condition than in the +$0 condition. 
The novel question regarding likelihood judgments was what 
would  happen  in  the  -$8  and  -$0  conditions.  A  2(-$0/ 
-$8) x 2(T1/T2) mixed ANOVA produced a significant effect for de- 
sire, F(1, 95) = 9.37, p < .01, and the T1/T2 main effect and the inter- 
action terms were not significant, both Fs < 1. Critically, the 
direction of the desirability effect was consistent with a 
desirability-bias interpretation, rather than a stake-likelihood 
interpretation. Participants gave lower likelihood estimates 
in the -$8 condition than in the -$0 condition (see Table 8). 
Table 9 displays the correlations for determining how 
information selection was related to confidence. Consistent with 
the no- prediction condition in Study 2, the magnitude of the 
selection bias was significantly related to T1 and T2 confidence, 
and this was true within all four desirability cells. The relationship 
between selection bias and change in confidence was significant 
within one of the four cells (and nearing significance for 
another). 
Given the strong correlations between the selection bias and T1 
confidence, we conducted the same mediation tests as reported for 
Study 2 (see Judd et al., 2001). First we tested for evidence that the 
selection bias mediated the +$10 vs. +$0 effect on confidence. Con- 
sistent with mediation, the differences in the selection biases were 
significant predictors of differences in T1 confidence (standardized 
coefficient = .51,  t(93) = 5.74,  p < .001).  The  intercept  from  the 
 
 
Table 9 
Correlations between selection biases and confidence in Study 3. 
 
Confidence/likelihood estimates and relations with selection bias 
 
Desirability 
condition 
 
r with T1 
estimate 
 
r with T2 
estimate 
 
r with change 
in estimates 
Table 8 displays mean T1 and T2 confidence estimates. 
Replicating Study 2, a 2(+$0/+$10) x 2(T1/T2) mixed ANOVA 
produced a significant effect for desire, F(1, 95) = 7.37, p < .01, 
and the T1/T2 main effect and the interaction terms were not 
significant, both 
 
 
3 
We cropped one of the paintings to better equate the appeal of the two paintings. 
This seems to have been somewhat successful; when participants were asked about 
their personal preferences among the two paintings, the selection rates were 
relatively balanced (55.2% vs. 44.8%)—unlike in the imbalance reported in the 
Preliminary analyses section of Study 1. 
 
+$10 .45
*** 
.62
*** 
.32
**
 
+$0 .45
*** 
.56
*** 
.10 
-$8 .42
*** 
.54
*** 
.13 
-$0 .43
*** 
.58
*** 
.17
a
 
 
 
Note: All values are bivariate correlations. For example, the upper left value (.45) is 
the correlation between the selection bias and T1 confidence in the +$10 condition. 
a   p < .10. 
⁄ p < .05. 
**   p < .01. 
***  p < .001. 
 
 
resulting model, which represents the effect of desirability beyond 
that carried by the selection bias, was not significant, t(93) = 1.37, 
p > .10. Second, we tested for evidence that the selection bias 
mediated the -$0 vs. -$8 effect on confidence. Again consistent 
with mediation, the differences in the selection biases were 
significant predictors of differences in T1 confidence 
(standardized coefficient = .53, t(93) = 6.10, p < .001). The 
intercept from the resulting model was borderline significant, 
t(93) = 1.8, p = .07. 
 
Discussion 
 
Study 3, like Study 2, showed that when the target outcome is 
made desirable—by virtue of a promise to win money—this fueled 
a tendency to select evidence supportive of the target, and it 
inflated likelihood judgments about the target. Study 3 also 
showed that when the target outcome is made undesirable—by 
virtue of a threat to lose money—the tendency to select evidence 
supporting the target decreases, as do the likelihood judgments 
about the tar- get. Both the desirability-bias hypothesis and the 
stake-likelihood hypothesis (modified from Vosgerau (2010) as 
discussed above) would anticipate the first set of results 
comparing desirable and neutral conditions. However, the 
second set of results involving the undesirable condition is 
inconsistent with the stake-likelihood hypothesis and instead 
supports the desirability-bias hypothesis. Before turning to the 
General Discussion, we will briefly discuss results from a follow-up 
to Study 3. 
 
Follow-Up Study 3.1 
 
We wanted to replicate the key finding that people were less 
prone to seek supportive information and give high likelihood 
judgments about an undesirable outcome (vs. a desirable out- 
come). We also wanted to introduce a slight modification to the 
paradigm to see if it would offer any support for the stake-likeli- 
hood hypothesis. In the undesirable (or -$8) condition of Study 
3, participants saw the target artwork listed with -$8 and the 
other with $0. If a participant’s sense of what is desirable and 
undesirable is primarily relative, then the $0 outcome could be 
viewed as desirable because it is better than the -$8 outcome. 
The -$8 outcome might essentially lose its salience as a negative 
outcome. With this in mind, we wondered whether results would 
be more supportive of stake-likelihood hypothesis in a follow-up 
study that presented artworks in sets of 4, rather than in pairs. 
Hence, in the -$8 condition of the follow-up, the target outcome 
was listed with -$8, whereas the other three artworks in the set 
were each listed with $0. With this situation, perhaps a -$8 out- 
come would more readily stand out as negative, which is presum- 
ably conducive for a stake-likelihood effect. We also had a $10 
condition and a $0 condition. In moving from 2 to 4 artworks per 
set, we also introduced a slight change to the buffets (to contain 
one positive and one negative comment about each artwork). 
There were 50 participants, and the design was within-subject. 
In large measure, the results led to same overall conclusions as 
did those from Study 3. Consistent with the desirability-bias 
hypothesis (but not stake-likelihood), there was a larger selection 
bias in the +$10 condition (M = 55.6%, SD = 27.1%) than the -$8 
condition (M = 42.8%, SD = 23.6%), t(49) = 2.44, p < .05. The mean 
in the $0 condition (M = 44.1%, SD = 23.0%) was between those 
for the +$10 and -$8 conditions, and significantly different from 
the +$10 condition, t(49) = 2.61, p < .05. Regarding likelihood judg- 
ments, the mean (T1 and T2 combined) was higher in the +$10 con- 
dition (M = 53.7%, SD = 24.1%) than the -$8 condition (M = 38.4%, 
SD = 23.9%), t(49) = 3.44, p < .001. The mean in the $0 condition 
(M = 49.3%, SD = 22.9%) was between those for +$10 and -$8 con- 
ditions,  and  significantly  different  from  the  -$8  condition, 
t(49) = 2.18, p < .05, but not from the $10 condition, t(49) = 0.91, 
p = .37. 
In short, we made a modest change to make a -$8 outcome 
stand out as undesirable rather than easily reframed as merely less 
desirable. Even under these conditions, the results supported the 
desirability-bias hypothesis and not the stake-likelihood 
hypothesis. 
 
General discussion 
 
At the start of this paper, we introduced an example of Alex, 
who just learned from her financial advisor that she would make 
more money if two companies merged. In other words, Alex has 
a newly established desire for a particular outcome. We suggested 
that a bird’s-eye view of the literature on motivated reasoning and 
desirability bias might lead to quick assumptions about how this 
desire for an outcome would influence Alex’s processing of new 
information and her expectations. However, with a closer look at 
the literature, it became clear that the specific possibility that de- 
sire itself—unconfounded with other factors such as prior 
expectations—would affect information search and optimism has 
not been adequately tested. We noted that there are plausible 
theoretical challenges to the idea that an optimistic bias in 
processing would dominate (e.g., with a moment of truth at 
hand, accountability and bracing concerns might be prominent; 
Gilovich et al., 1993; Shepperd, Findley-Klein, Kwavnick, Walker, 
& Perez, 2000; Sweeny, Carroll, & Shepperd, 2006; van Dijk, 
Zeelenberg, & van der Pligt, 2003). Moreover, most direct tests of 
the idea that desire would impact likelihood judgments had 
suggested that outcome desirability would have no effect (e.g., 
Price & Marquez, 2005; Windschitl et al., 2010; see meta-
analysis by Krizan and Windschitl (2007)) or perhaps even a 
pessimistic effect (Vosgerau, 2010). 
To respond to these unresolved issues in the literature, we 
developed a paradigm with three key features: (1) direct 
experimental manipulations of outcome desirability, (2) 
presentations of new heterogeneous information after participants 
learned about outcome desirability, and (3) measures of both 
information selection and likelihood judgment. We also 
developed a variation on this paradigm—in which participants 
made their own predictions—to test some unresolved issues 
related to the overconfidence literature (Studies 1 and 2). In the 
end, our empirical work produced clear evidence of motivated 
searches and inflated optimism caused by outcome desirability. 
More specifically, Study 1 demonstrated that people tend to 
select information that favors rather than opposes their 
predictions— even though the predictions concerned entirely 
novel outcomes. Critically, the magnitude of this selection bias 
was predictive of the change in participants’ confidence from 
before to after reading the information they selected from the 
buffet. The causal connection was verified in the second follow-
up to Study 1 (Follow-Up 1.2). The first follow-up to Study 1 
(Follow-Up 1.1) demonstrated that the selection biases persisted 
even when people were made aware that they would be able to 
update their prediction given new information that they read 
from the buffet. 
The findings from Study 1 and the follow-ups are compatible 
with, but distinct from, existing theory and research on 
overconfidence. Researchers have previously discussed and 
theorized about the possibility that people’s overconfidence 
stems from their tendency to focus primarily on reasons why they 
might be right rather than why they might be wrong in their 
prediction. However, tests of this notion have been indirect 
ones. For example, perhaps the most widely cited example 
comes from Koriat et al. (1980) who tested and found that a 
consider-the-opposite intervention led to slightly better 
calibration in confidence estimates, presumably be- cause people 
were prompted to think of evidence (against their 
 
 
prediction) that they otherwise would neglect. Our hypothesis was 
about selections when a heterogeneous set of new information is 
made available. Study 1and its follow-ups showed that when 
people are provided with a heterogeneous set of new information, 
they will engage in biased selection consistent with their initial 
prediction, which ultimately will feed into their subsequent 
confidence. Whereas Study 1 did not fully isolate the role of 
desirability, Studies  2  and  3  did  by  means  of  a  
straightforward  monetary manipulation. When a target outcome 
that was randomly specified by the computer was made desirable 
(because $10 was promised if it was true), this enhanced the 
tendency of people to select information that supported it and 
also increased the judged likelihood of it being true. Study 3 
also found that when a target outcome was  made  undesirable  
rather  than  desirable,  participants  were more likely to select 
information against the outcome, and their likelihood  judgments  
tended  to  be  lower  (see  also  Follow-Up 3.1). The effects of 
these manipulations on likelihood judgments were seen 
immediately after participants made biased selections from the 
information buffet—even before they read the full-length versions 
of the comments they had selected. This finding suggests that 
even biased perusing and selection of short evaluative titles was 
enough to fuel biased optimism. Mediation analyses provided 
evidence consistent with the notion that the effect of desire on 
likelihood judgment was mediated by selection biases. 
Results from Studies 2 and 3 also suggest that the post-prediction 
selection bias is not attributable to a generic cognitive tendency or 
positive test strategy for any hypothesis. Namely, the participants 
who were assigned a target hypothesis by the computer and were 
promised nothing ($0) did not show any selection bias. Furthermore, 
the fact that the monetary desirability manipulation produced 
reliable effects on selection biases in Studies 2 and 3 bodes well 
for the notion that a related desire—namely a desire to be right 
about one’s own prediction—could be a key contributor to selection 
biases that occur after predictions (see Blanton, Pelham, DeHart, & 
Carvallo, 2001; Scherer et al., 2013). It is interesting to note (but 
open to multiple interpretations) that the effect of the prediction-
vs.-no-prediction manipulation on selection bias in Study 2 was 
much stronger than the effect of the $10-vs.-$0 manipulation. 
 
Wishful thinking and stakes likelihood 
 
Our findings are critical for the literature on the desirability bias 
because there are many studies that attempted, but failed, to find 
evidence of enhanced likelihood judgments as a function of 
outcome-desirability manipulations (for review see Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007). One set of authors let their titles express the 
state of affairs: ‘‘The Elusive Wishful Thinking Effect’’ (Bar-Hillel 
& Budescu, 1995) and ‘‘Wishful Thinking in Predicting World Cup 
Results: Still Elusive’’ (Bar-Hillel et al., 2008). However, Studies 2, 
3, and 3.1 change matters, and wishful thinking now seems less 
elusive than it did before. 
Moreover, the present findings suggest some potential boundary 
conditions on the recently developed stake-likelihood hypothesis 
(Vosgerau, 2010). Again, as originally described, Vosgerau’s 
hypothesis posited that arousal from a negative (or positive) 
stake in an outcome can be misattributed and inflate likelihood 
judgment. He showed, for example, that judgments regarding 
probability questions were higher when those questions were 
printed on vibrant- pink paper rather than grey paper. In one study 
(Study 3), Vosgerau also directly manipulated desirability of 
outcomes. In key conditions, participants were told they would 
either win or lose a valued prize (a shot glass with a university 
emblem) if four simulated dice rolls yielded exactly two sixes. 
Likelihood judgments for these conditions (combined) were 
elevated relative to those from a neutral/control condition, which 
supports the stake-likelihood hypothesis. As noted earlier, the 
overall pattern of comparisons 
between   the   desirable   and   undesirable   conditions   suggested 
some pessimism; see Vosgerau’s discussion of his Study 3. 
All this begs the following question: Why did Vosgerau (2010) 
third study fail to produce evidence of a desirability bias, whereas 
our studies produced robust desirability biases? Perhaps part of 
the difference is that Vosgerau’s third study concerned stochastic 
outcomes (dice rolls). As  discussed in their  review, Krizan  and 
Windschitl (2007) revealed that results of studies on desirability 
bias tend to be different for studies involving stochastic outcomes 
and nonstochastic outcomes (see also Windschitl et al., 2010). Per- 
haps even more relevant, is the fact that participants in Vogerau’s 
study, unlike those in our studies, received no new information to 
select from. That is, biased information selection was not in play. 
Perhaps if people can look for optimistic information, as they could 
in the present studies, they do—even if cautiously. Having found 
new evidence to be optimistic about, likelihood judgments were 
inflated. These ideas remain speculation at this time. We think it 
is important to note that the stake-likelihood hypothesis and the 
desirability-bias hypothesis can both be valid—depending on the 
context in which they are applied. In the present context, however, 
the effects of the desirability bias were clearly stronger than any 
type of stake-likelihood effect. 
 
Conclusion 
 
When people have an opportunity to select new information 
after having made a prediction or after having discovered they 
would benefit from a particular outcome, they have an important 
opportunity. If they have made a  prediction,  they  can  use  the 
new information as a basis for a revision of the prediction or at 
least a dampening of initial optimism about it (when warranted). 
If the context did not require an initial prediction, they have a 
blank slate on which to develop a realistic sense of optimism. In 
our studies, however, participants tended toward checking for 
optimistic information, and this bias fueled optimism. Decision 
makers in business, government, military, health, legal, and other 
fields face similar situations: They make predictions and need to 
assess the likelihood of outcomes that they might see as desirable 
or undesirable. They also often have easy access to new 
information—sometimes in abundant amounts. Even if the buffet 
of avail- able information is unbiased, the selection of information 
appears to be a process that is ripe for initial bias. 
 
Appendix A 
 
This appendix shows the titles and full comments listed for the 
photography artwork. The titles appeared in the buffet (see Fig. 1) 
and were randomized separately for each participant. Participants 
read the full comments of only those titles they selected from the 
buffet. 
 
Title: Ocean Photo is very soothing to look at. 
Full Comment: Looking at this picture, you can almost hear the 
sound of the ocean and the crashing of the waves against the 
rocks. It looks so peaceful, and it leaves you wishing that you 
could be standing there watching such a marvelous example 
of the power of nature. I have never seen the ocean look so 
powerful and soothing at the same time. 
Title: Ocean Photo has an exciting dynamic. 
Full Comment: This photo is exciting for me to look at because it 
seems to be set to motion. It has captured the beauty of a sunset 
on the water as genuinely as photograph could without actually 
being there to see it for yourself. The reflection that the sun has 
on the water must have taken a lot of patience from the 
photographer as it seems to be done almost at the perfect 
moment. The 
 
 
wave crashing on the rock was the focal point for me as it really 
gives you a sense of what the setting is really like; any closer 
and I could hear the wave break. 
Title: Ocean Photo doesn’t have much color. 
Full Comment: You would think that for an amazing outdoor set- 
ting like this that the picture would naturally just take your 
breath away. Maybe it’s the bland and hazy background, but 
this picture is actually a little boring to look at. Maybe if the 
light had been better or the photographer has chosen a different 
angel, the picture would have turned out better. 
Title: Ocean Photo has no unique qualities. 
Full Comment: I am not drawn to this picture at all. It is very 
dark and the lighting to me is not quite right. I also do not think 
the scene itself is very impressive, sharp pointy rocks are not 
that appealing to me. I get bored when I look at the picture 
and I am not sure what I am supposed to be focusing on. For 
instance the ocean does not really stand out, maybe if the 
brightness of the ocean was more apparent it would be more 
attractive. 
Title: Mountain Photo captures the beauty of the mountains. 
Full  Comment:  This photo successfully captures the beauty of 
the mountain range. The coloration of the different elements 
of  land  complements  themselves  well.  It  looks  peaceful  and 
pure. It makes me want to be outside and enjoying all the 
wonderful sites to see. This photo is without a doubt a 
magnificent masterpiece. 
Title: Mountain Photo is a well detailed photo. 
Full Comment: This photo has a lot of detail because it portrays 
several elements like the water, mountains, and forests. The 
camera angle is also very clever because it captures everything 
and shows the reflection of the mountain on the water with the 
view of some rocks submerged in water. It also shows half of 
the mountain in shadow and the other half very bright. 
Title: Mountain Photo looks a little too perfect. 
Full Comment: The picture looks digitally enhanced which 
makes it just look fake. It gives you a sense of this ideal image 
of nature. Also in the photo an area of trees are really dark 
bringing the beautiful colors in this piece down. The trees 
definitely stand out as a negative spot, so maybe taking a 
different angle of the scene it would eliminate the dark spot of 
the trees. Title: Mountain Photo has too much going on. 
Full Comment: Though the picture is no doubt aesthetically 
appealing, it just does not do it for me. I wish the photographer 
would have just focused on one of the natural surroundings 
because it is a little too much to take in at once. The trees, the 
lake, the mountains, the sky, the reflection. . .any one of these 
would have made a great photograph. With this photo I have 
way too much to look at and need a central focal point because 
right now I am clueless to what that could be. I would also be 
interested to learn if the photographer enhanced any of the 
photo’s images; it looks a little fake to me. 
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